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Abstract.
In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication
in cooperative games as introduced in Myerson (1977) by allowing communication
links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which
the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model the communication network by
a directed graph and the cooperative game by a generalized characteristic function
as introduced in Nowak and Radzik (1994). We generalize the Myerson value for
undirected (or standard) communication situations to the context of directed com-
munication and provide two axiomatizations of this digraph Myerson value using
component efficiency and either fairness or the balanced contributions property.
Keywords. Myerson value, Digraph communication situations.
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1 Introduction
A situation in which a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n} can generate certain
payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable
utility (or simply a TU-game). Besides the player set, a TU-game consists of
a characteristic function assigning to every subset of players (coalition) a real
number which represents the worth that these players can obtain by agreeing
to cooperate.
In a TU-game there are no restrictions on the cooperation possibilities of the
players, i.e., every coalition is feasible and can generate a worth. Restrictions
on cooperation can arise from limiting communication possibilities between the
players. This is a well-known topic introduced by Myerson (1977) that created
a model in which players in a TU-game also are the nodes in an undirected
communication graph. The idea, then, is that players can only cooperate and
form a feasible coalition if its members are connected in the communication
graph. As a solution, Myerson (1977) proposes to apply the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953) to a modified game in which the worth of a coalition equals
the sum of the worths of its connected components. This solution is nowadays
known as the Myerson value. Also, he gave an axiomatization of this solution
in terms of component efficiency and fairness properties. Later, Myerson (1980)
provides another axiomatization replacing fairness by balanced contributions.
The above mentioned model assumes that the communication links are sym-
metric, meaning that both players incident with the link have equal control
over or access to the link. However, in many cases, communication is directed
and thus the model based on undirected graphs is not suitable. This can be so,
for example, because one of the players is able to initiate the communication
or the relation but the other is not. In some occasions this is imposed by some
regulatory authority. In other types of relations, as the network of citations of
academic papers, it is obvious that each link has necessarily a fixed direction.
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In order to model these situations, in this paper we identify a communication
network with a directed graph. Moreover, we allow the worth of a coalition
to depend on the order in which the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we
apply generalized characteristic functions as introduced in Nowak and Radzik
(1994). In a standard characteristic function any coalition or combination of
players earns a certain worth. In a generalized characteristic function any or-
dered coalition or permutation of players earns a worth. It can be, for example,
that the coalition that consists of players 1 and 2 earns a certain worth if first
player 1 enters and then player 2, but earns a different worth if the players
enter in the opposite order. So, a directed communication situation consists of
a generalized TU-game and a directed graph on the player set. The model of
Myerson can be seen as a directed communication situation where the worth
of any permutation of a set of players is the same and, in the directed graph,
between any pair of players there is either no arc or two arcs, one going in
each direction. One of the main aims of the present paper is to generalize the
model of undirected communication situations and the corresponding Myer-
son value to this new setting. To do this, we introduce a restricted game and
a value that, for the case in which the directed communication situation is
equivalent to an undirected one, yield the classical graph restricted game and
the Myerson value.
The main issue that we must address is the way that the directed graph has an
effect on the cooperation possibilities, i.e., what are the ‘connected’ or feasible
coalitions in a directed graph. We call an ordered coalition connected if for
every two consecutive players in the ordering there is a directed path from the
predecessor to the successor (possibly containing players outside the coalition).
Using this idea of connectedness, we assign to every directed communication
situation a standard TU-game where the worth of any coalition depends on the
dividends in the generalized characteristic function of all connected ordered
subcoalitions. As solution for directed communication situations, we propose
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the Shapley value of this TU-game. This solution generalizes the Myerson
value for undirected (or standard) communication situations as described in
the previous paragraph.
We also generalize the axiomatizations using component efficiency and either
fairness or the balanced contributions property.
Myerson (1977) also shows stability for superadditive games, meaning that
creating a link between two players does not decrease their payoffs in case the
game is superadditive. We show that this is not the case in our more general
framework.
Another approach to the study of models in which restrictions in the com-
munications are given by a directed graph can be found in Slikker and Van
den Nouweland (2001). They characterized the so called allocation rules for
directed communication situations which in their context consists of a set of
players, a directed reward function, and a directed communication network.
This directed reward function assigns a value to every possible directed com-
munication network defined on the player set.
In Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992), van den Brink and Gilles (1996),
Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997), the model of games with
a permission structure, consisting of a (standard) TU-game and a directed
graph is analyzed. They consider solutions applied to restricted games derived
from the game and a directed graph, but that model does not generalize the
Myerson restricted game nor the Myerson value for communication situations.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. After discussing some
preliminaries on games, graphs and directed graphs in Section 2, in Section
3 we describe the model of directed communication and define connectedness
yielding feasible coalitions and restricted games in these situations. In Section
4 we provide the two axiomatizations of the digraph Myerson value. Section
4
5 concludes with final remarks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Games and Generalized Games
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. A game in characteristic
function form (a coalitional game or a TU-game) is a pair (N, v) where v (the
characteristic function) is a real function defined on 2N , the set of all subsets
of N (coalitions), that satisfies v(∅) = 0. For each S ∈ 2N , v(S) represents the
(transferable) utility that players in S can obtain if they decide to cooperate.
Implicitly, it is supposed that, if the players in S form a coalition, members
of S must talk together and achieve a binding agreement.
We will denote by s the cardinality of the coalition S ⊂ N and GN will be the
2n−1 dimensional vector space of TU-games with player set N . Its unanimity
games basis {uS}∅=S⊂N is defined as follows:
for all S ⊂ N , S = ∅, uS(T ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, S ⊂ T
0, otherwise.
A solution for TU-games is a function which assigns a payoff vector x ∈ IRn
to every TU-game in GN . One of the most famous solutions is the Shapley
value (Shapley (1953)), ϕ, which is given by:
ϕi(N, v) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)), for all i ∈ N.
Nevertheless, in many social or economic situations, the formation of coalitions
is a process in which not only the members of the coalitions are important
but also the order in which they appear. Taking this idea into account, Nowak
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and Radzik (1994) introduced the concept of game in generalized characteristic
function form.
For each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, let us denote by π(S) the set of all permutations or
ordered coalitions of the players in S and, for notational convenience, π(∅) =
{∅}. We will denote Ω(N) = {T ∈ π(S) | S ⊂ N} being the set of all ordered
coalitions with players in N .
Given an ordered coalition T ∈ Ω(N), there exists S ⊂ N such that T ∈ π(S).
We will denote H(T ) = S as the set of players in the ordered coalition T , and
t = |H(T )|.
A game in generalized characteristic function form is a pair (N, v), N being
the player set and v a real function (the generalized characteristic function),
defined on Ω(N) and satisfying v(∅) = 0.
For each S ⊂ N , and for every ordered coalition T ∈ π(S), v(T ) represents the
economic possibilities of the players in S if the coalition is formed following
the order given by T . When there is no ambiguity with respect to the set of
players N , we will identify the (generalized) game (N, v) with its (generalized)
characteristic function v.
We will denote by GN the set of all generalized cooperative games with players
set N . GN is a vector space with dimension |Ω(N)| − 1. Let us observe that
there exists an isomorphism between the vector space GN and the subspace
of GN consisting of all games for which v(T ) = v(R) if H(T ) = H(R) holds.
Intuitively, for games in GN , the order in which the coalitions are formed is
irrelevant.
Taking into account the previous idea we will sometimes identify each game
v ∈ GN with the (transformed) game vˆ ∈ GN defined by:
vˆ(T ) = v(H(T )) for all T ∈ Ω(N).
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Each ordered coalition T = (i1, . . . , it) ∈ Ω(N) establishes a strict linear order
≺T in H(T ), defined as follows:
for all i, j ∈ H(T ), i ≺T j (i precedes j in T ) if and only if there exist
k, l ∈ {1, . . . , t}, k < l, such that i = ik, j = il.
Given two ordered coalitions T,R ∈ Ω(N), we will denote T ⊂˜R if and only if:
a) H(T ) ⊂ H(R), and
b) ∀ i, j ∈ H(T ), i ≺T j implies i ≺R j.
Example 2.1 Given N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, T = (3, 1), R = (2, 3, 4, 1) and P =
(4, 1, 2, 3), T ⊂˜R holds, but T ⊂˜P does not, as 3 ≺T 1 and 1 ≺P 3.
In this paper, a special basis of GN , the generalized unanimity basis, consisting
of the (generalized) unanimity games {wT}∅=T∈Ω(N), will often be used. For
any T ∈ Ω(N) \ {∅}, the generalized characteristic function wT is defined as
follows:
for all R ∈ Ω(N), wT (R) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if T ⊂˜R
0, otherwise.
The transformed games {uˆS}∅=S⊂N of the classical unanimity games
{uS}∅=S⊂N of GN , can be easily expressed in terms of the {wT}∅=T∈Ω(N) in
the following way:
uˆS =
∑
T∈π(S)
wT , for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
For a given v ∈ GN , {Δ∗v(T )}∅=T∈Ω(N) is the set of the generalized unanimity
coefficients of v (the coordinates of v in the generalized unanimity basis).
Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os (1997) proved that, for all T ∈ Ω(N) \ {∅}:
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Δ∗v(T ) =
∑
R⊂˜T
(−1)t−rv(R).
In their seminal paper on games in generalized characteristic function form,
Nowak and Radzik (1994), define a value for these games that generalizes the
Shapley value for TU-games. Later, Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os (1997) define and
study another generalization of the Shapley value for TU-games to this class
of generalized games, differing from the former in null player and symmetry
axioms. A class of solutions including both previously mentioned is discussed
in van den Brink et al. (2008)
Finally, given a game v ∈ GN , the average game v ∈ GN is defined as follows:
v(S) =
1
s!
∑
T∈π(S)
v(T ), S ⊂ N.
2.2 Graphs and Directed Graphs
A graph is a pair (N, γ), N = {1, 2, . . . , n} being a finite set of nodes and γ a
collection of links (edges or ties), that is, unordered pairs {i, j} with i, j ∈ N ,
i = j. A graph (N, δ) is a subgraph of (N, γ) if δ ⊂ γ. We will denote by ΓN
the class of all graphs with nodes set N . When there is no ambiguity with
respect to N , we will refer to the graph (N, γ) as γ.
If {i, j} ∈ γ, we will say that i and j are directly connected in γ. We will say
that i and j are connected in γ if it is possible to join them by a sequence
of edges from γ. We will say that a subset S of N is connected in (N, γ) if
any pair of nodes i and j in S are connected in γ. (Note that this is different
than the notion of connectedness in Myerson (1977), where a coalition S is
connected if every pair of players in S are connected by a path only containing
players that belong to that coalition.)
Given a graph (N, γ), the notion of connectivity induces a partition of N in
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connected components. Two nodes i and j, i = j, are in the same connected
component if and only if they are connected. By connected component we
mean what is also known as a maximal connected subset. Note that, although
our definition of connectedness is different than that in Myerson (1977), we
get the same components in a graph. N/γ denotes the set of all connected
components in γ and more generally, for each S ⊂ N , S/γ is the set of all
connected components in the partial graph (S, γ|S), γ|S being the set of those
links {i, j} ∈ γ where both i and j are elements of S.
Given a graph (N, γ) and a subset S ⊂ N , we will note:
Pγ(S) = {U ⊂ S | U = ∅ and U connected in (S, γ|S)}.
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N, d), N = {1, 2, . . . n} being a set
of nodes and d a subset of the collection of all ordered pairs (i, j), i = j, of
elements of N . Each pair (i, j) ∈ d is called an arc. In the following, if there is
no ambiguity with respect to N , we will refer to the digraph (N, d) as d. We
will denote DN for the set of all possible digraphs with nodes set N .
3 The model
3.1 Connectedness in digraphs
In the following, the way that the directed graph has an effect on the connec-
tion possibilities, i.e., which are the connected sets in a directed graph, is of
special importance.
Given a digraph (N, d), if (i, j) ∈ d, we will say that i is directly connected with
j. Obviously, if i is directly connected with j, the reverse is not necessarily
true. If i is not directly connected with j in the digraph, it may still be possible
to connect them, provided that there are other nodes through which we can
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do so. We will say that i is connected with j in the digraph (N, d) if there is
a directed path connecting them, i.e., if there exists an ordered sequence of
nodes in N , (i1, i2, . . . , is), such that i1 = i, is = j and (il, il+1) ∈ d for all
l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s− 1}.
To study directed communication we now come to the notion of connectedness
of an ordered set in a directed graph. We will say that an ordered set T =
(i1, i2, . . . , it) ∈ Ω(N) is connected in the digraph (N, d) if, for all l = 1, . . . , t−
1, il is connected (not necessarily directly connected) with il+1 in the digraph
(N, d). 1
For each subset S ⊂ N , we will denote:
Ωd(S) = {T ∈ Ω(S) | T connected in (S, d|S)},
where, for all S ⊂ N , d|S = {(i, j) ∈ d | i, j ∈ S}.
Given a digraph (N, d) ∈ DN , we can define the induced graph (N, γ(d)) in
ΓN as follows:
γ(d) = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N and [(i, j) ∈ d or (j, i) ∈ d]}
A (not ordered) set C ⊂ N is a component in the digraph (N, d) if C ∈ N/γ(d),
i.e., if C is a connected component in the graph (N, γ(d)). So, given a digraph
(N, d) ∈ DN we will establish a partition of N in components. We will denote
by N/d the set of all the components of the directed graph (N, d). Obviously,
N/d = N/γ(d).
Let us observe that, given a component C ∈ N/d and T ∈ Ω(C), it is possible
1 This concept of connectedness is different from that of Amer, Gime´nez and
Magan˜a (2007) who consider connected ordered sets in which each node is directly
connected with its successor. Obviously, this connectedness concept does not gen-
eralize the classical one in the Myerson model.
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that T is not an ordered connected set in (N, d).
Example 3.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and d = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 4)} as in
Fig. 1. In this case:
Fig. 1. Digraph in Example 3.1
i) Ordered coalitions T = (1, 2, 4) and R = (1, 3, 2, 4) are connected in
(N, d), but T ′ = (1, 4, 3) is not.
ii) γ(d) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}, and N/d = N/γ(d) = {N}.
iii) Given S = {1, 2, 4} ⊂ N , d|S = {(1, 2)}; S/d = {{1, 2}, {4}}; Ωd(S) =
Ωd|S(S) = {(1), (2), (4), (1, 2)}; γ(d|S) = γ(d)|S = {{1, 2}}.
Given a graph (N, γ) ∈ ΓN , let us denote by (N, d(γ)) the digraph containing,
for each link {i, j} ∈ γ, two arcs (i, j) and (j, i). The map that assigns to each
graph (N, γ) the digraph (N, d(γ)) is a bijection between ΓN and its image
set in DN . In this sense, ΓN is a subset of DN .
Let us observe that, for any graph (N, γ) ∈ ΓN and for each C ∈ N/γ:
Ωd(γ)(C) = Ω(C) holds,
that is, all ordered subsets T ∈ π(S) with S ⊂ C are connected in the digraph
(N, d(γ)).
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3.2 Directed Communication Situations
A directed communication situation 2 (or digraph communication situation) is
a triplet (N, v, d) where (N, v) ∈ GN is a generalized TU-game and (N, d) ∈
DN is a directed graph. No particular relation is assumed between the game
v and the digraph d other than the nodes in the digraph being the players in
the game. This definition generalizes the well-known one of a communication
situation (N, v, γ), in which (N, v) ∈ GN and (N, γ) ∈ ΓN . We will denote
by CSN and DCSN the sets of all (standard) communication situations and
directed communication situations with nodes set N respectively.
We can associate to every digraph communication situation (N, v, d) a (stan-
dard) cooperative game (N, vd) ∈ GN which incorporates both, the possible
gains from cooperation (influenced by the coalitional order) as modeled by the
generalized cooperative game (N, v) and the restrictions in the communica-
tions, reflected by the digraph (N, d).
In order that the definition for (N, vd) can be easily understood, let us consider
the idea of a game with restrictions in communication as it was introduced
by Myerson (1977). For (N, v, γ) ∈ CSN , he defined the graph-restricted game
vγ ∈ GN as the game with characteristic function:
vγ(S) =
∑
C∈S/γ
v(C), for all S ⊂ N.
The previous definition can be rewritten in terms of the dividends of game
(N, v) as follows:
2 This denomination is used in Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001) with a dif-
ferent meaning. Nevertheless we have preferred to maintain it in order to emphasize
the generalization of the classical concept of communication situation to this new
setting of directed graphs.
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vγ(S) =
∑
U∈Pγ(S)
Δv(U) =
∑
R∈Ωd(γ)(S)
1
r!
Δv(H(R)). (1)
The first equality in (1) holds because:
∀ C ∈ S/γ, v(C) = ∑
∅= U⊂C
Δv(U) =
∑
U∈Pγ(C)
Δv(U).
as C ∈ S/γ and ∅ = U ⊂ C implies U connected in (S, γ|S), and obviously: U
is connected in (S, γ|S) if and only if there exists C ∈ S/γ such that U ⊂ C.
The last equality in (1) holds because R ∈ Ωd(γ)(S) if and only if there exists
C ∈ S/γ such that U = H(R) ⊂ C. Then, for each one of the r! ordered
coalitions R ∈ π(U), Δv(H(R)) = Δv(U) holds.
Generalizing this idea, given (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN , we will define the characteris-
tic function of (N, vd) ∈ GN . Suppose that in (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN , each coalition
S can only obtain the dividends Δ∗v(R) of its ordered subcoalitions R ∈ Ω(S)
that are connected in the (partial) digraph (S, d|S). So, we define:
vd(S) =
∑
R∈Ωd(S)
1
r!
Δ∗v(R), S ⊂ N.
We can consider vd(S) to be the expected dividend of all subcoalitions in S.
For each subcoalition of S, this expectation is computed as the average of the
r! quantities: ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Δ∗v(R), if R ∈ π(H(R)) ∩ Ωd(S)
0, ifR ∈ π(H(R)) \ Ωd(S).
As, for each S ⊂ N , Ωd(S) = ⋃
C∈S/d
Ωd(C) holds, we can rewrite the previous
definition as follows:
vd(S) =
∑
C∈S/d
vd(C) =
∑
C∈S/d
∑
R∈Ωd(C)
1
r!
Δ∗v(R), for all S ⊂ N .
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In the next proposition we obtain a different expression for vd(S), S ⊂ N .
This new expression (which can be considered as an alternative definition),
establishes a direct relation between the characteristic functions of the games
(N, v) ∈ GN and (N, vd) ∈ GN .
Proposition 3.1 Let (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN . Then, the characteristic function of
game (N, vd) is given by:
vd(S) =
∑
C∈S/d
∑
R∈Ωd(C)
λd(R)v(R), for each S ⊂ N, (2)
where, for each R ∈ Ωd(C), λd(R) = ∑
T∈Ωd(C), T ⊃˜R
(−1)t−r
t!
.
Proof 3.1 From the definition of the game vd:
vd(S) =
∑
C∈S/d
vd(C) =
∑
C∈S/d
∑
T∈Ωd(C)
Δ∗v(T )
t!
=
=
∑
C∈S/d
∑
T∈Ωd(C)
∑
T ⊃˜R
(−1)t−r
t!
v(R) =
∑
C∈S/d
∑
R∈Ωd(C)
λd(R)v(R). 
We will prove that, if we restrict ourselves to communication situations (in
which case the game is equivalent to a standard TU-game and the digraph
is equivalent to a graph), then the defined digraph restricted game coincides
with the Myerson one. To do this, let us first obtain the expression of the
restricted game when in the directed communication situation the digraph is
a graph but the game is a generalized one.
Proposition 3.2 Let (N, γ) be a graph in ΓN and consider the digraph com-
munication situation (N, v, d(γ)) ∈ DCSN . Then, for all S ⊂ N :
vd(γ)(S) =
∑
C∈S/d(γ)
∑
R∈π(C)
v(R)
r!
= vγ(S). (3)
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Proof 3.2 From Proposition 3.1, for all S ⊂ N we have:
vd(γ)(S) =
∑
C∈S/d(γ)
∑
R∈Ωd(γ)(C)
λd(γ)(R)v(R).
Again, as (N, γ) is a graph, if C ∈ S/d(γ), then Ωd(γ)(C) = Ω(C) holds.
It is obvious that, for C ∈ S/d(γ), if R ∈ π(C) then λd(γ)(R) = 1
r!
.
On the other hand, if R ∈ Ω(C) \ π(C) we have:
λd(γ)(R) =
∑
T∈Ω(C), T ⊃˜R
(−1)t−r
t!
=
c−r∑
m=0
(
c− r
m
)(
r + m
m
)
m!
(−1)r+m−r
(r + m)!
=
=
c−r∑
m=0
(
c− r
m
)
1
r!
(−1)m = 0.
Then, for all S ⊂ N :
vd(γ)(S) =
∑
C∈S/d(γ)
∑
R∈π(C)
v(R)
r!
.
The last equality in (3) trivially holds because of the definition of v. 
The next proposition gives the particular expression of the characteristic func-
tion of (N, vd) for digraph communication situations in which the digraph is
a graph and the game is a TU-game.
Proposition 3.3 Let (N, v, γ) ∈ CSN and consider the digraph communica-
tion situation (N, vˆ, d(γ)) with vˆ(R) = v(H(R)) for all R ∈ Ω(N). Then,
vˆd(γ) = vγ holds.
Proof 3.3 From Proposition 3.2, vˆd(γ) =
(
vˆ
)γ
. On the other hand, it is obvi-
ous that, for all v ∈ GN , vˆ = v. Thus, the proposition holds. 
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3.3 Allocation rules for digraph communication situations
An allocation rule for digraph communication situations with nodes-players
set N is a function Ψ : DCSN → IRn that associates a vector of payoffs to
each digraph communication situation.
Different allocation rules can be obtained by applying different solution con-
cepts to the game (N, vd). In this paper, we restrict ourselves to ϕ, the Shap-
ley value (Shapley, 1953). For communication situations (N, v, γ) ∈ CSN , the
Shapley value of game (N, vγ) is known in the literature as the Myerson value.
Because of previous propositions, given (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN , the Shapley value of
(N, vd) is a natural extension of the Myerson value for digraph communication
situations. Then, we have the following definition.
Definition 3.1 The Myerson value for directed communication situations
(from now on, digraph Myerson value) is the allocation rule μ defined as fol-
lows:
μ(N, v, d) = ϕ(N, vd), for every (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN .
The first interesting property of this allocation rule is its additivity.
Definition 3.2 An allocation rule Ψ : DCSN −→ IRn is additive if, for all
(N, v, d), (N,w, d) ∈ DCSN , Ψ(N, v + w, d) = Ψ(N, v, d) + Ψ(N,w, d).
Proposition 3.4 The digraph Myerson value is additive.
Proof 3.4 This is straightforward taking into account the additivity of the
Shapley value and the fact that, if (N, v, d), (N,w, d) ∈ DCSN , then (v+w)d =
= vd + wd. 
Example 3.2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, d = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4)}, as in Fig.
2 and v ∈ GN be defined as follows: v = ∑
i,j∈N, i=j
w(i,j).
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Fig. 2. Digraph in Example 3.2
Taking into account that vd =
∑
i,j∈N, i=j
wd(i,j) and
wd(i,j) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2!
u{i,j}, if (i, j) ∈ d
1
2!
[
u{1,2,4} + u{1,3,4} − u{1,2,3,4}
]
, if (i, j) = (1, 4)
0, otherwise
we have:
μ(N, v, d) = ϕ(N, vd) =
∑
i,j∈N, i=j
ϕ(N,wd(i,j)) =
1
2!
[ϕ(u{1,2}) + ϕ(u{1,3})+
+ϕ(u{1,3}) + ϕ(u{2,4}) + ϕ(u{3,4}) + ϕ(u{1,2,4}) + ϕ(u{1,3,4})− ϕ(u{1,2,3,4})] =
=
1
2!
[(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0
)
+
(
1
2
, 0,
1
2
, 0
)
+ . . . +
(
1
3
, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
)
−
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
)]
=
=
(
17
24
,
13
24
,
13
24
,
17
24
)
.
4 Two characterizations of the digraph Myerson value
This section is devoted to characterize the digraph Myerson value from its
properties: component efficiency, fairness and balanced contributions.
An allocation rule for digraph communication situations satisfies the compo-
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nent efficiency property if the total payoff for the members of a component
equals its worth under the restrictions in the communication. Formally,
Definition 4.1 An allocation rule Ψ : DCSN → IRn is component efficient
if, for all (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN and all C ∈ N/d, it holds that:
∑
i∈C
Ψi(N, v, d) = v
d(C).
Remark 4.1 The previous definition extends the classical one for standard
communication situations. This is obvious from the fact that, for (N, v, γ) ∈
CSN , vγ(C) = v(C) if C ∈ N/γ.
The fairness property for digraph communication situations states that if the
possibility for direct communication between two players i and j disappears,
other things being equal (i.e., the network changes to another one in which
the arc l = (i, j) or the arc (j, i) is removed), then the payoffs of both players
change by the same amount.
Definition 4.2 An allocation rule Ψ : DCSN → IRn is fair if, for all
(N, v, d) ∈ DCSN and all (i, j) ∈ d, the following holds:
Ψi(N, v, d)−Ψi(N, v, d \ {(i, j)} = Ψj(N, v, d)−Ψj(N, v, d \ {(i, j)}).
Remark 4.2 The classical definition of fairness for (graph) communication
situations can be obtained applying the previous one in a two step process.
This is so because a link {i, j} can be viewed as the pair of arcs (i, j) and
(j, i). However, note that fairness as defined above is stronger than applying
Myerson’s fairness with respect to deleting the two arcs at the same time, since
that allows differences in the change of payoffs when deleting each arc but in
the two step process these differences should be of opposite sign and equal in
absolute value.
It turns out that the above two properties characterize the digraph Myerson
18
value.
Theorem 4.1 The digraph Myerson value is the unique allocation rule Ψ :
DCSN → IRn satisfying component efficiency and fairness.
Proof 4.1 In order to prove component efficiency, let (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN and
C ∈ N/d. Then:
∑
i∈C
μi(N, v, d) =
∑
i∈C
μi(C, v|C , d|C) =
∑
i∈C
ϕi
(
C, (v|C)d|C
)
=
=
∑
i∈C
ϕi
(
C, (v|C)d
)
= vd(C).
The last equality holds because of the efficiency of the Shapley value.
Turning now to the fairness property of the digraph Myerson value, suppose
that (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN and let i, j ∈ N be such that (i, j) ∈ d, then:
μi(N, v, d) = ϕi(N, v
d) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
s!(n− 1− s)!
n!
[
vd(S ∪ {i})− vd(S)
]
=
=
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
(s + 1)!(n− 2− s)!
n!
[
vd(S ∪ {i, j})− vd(S ∪ {j})
]
+
+
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− 1− s)!
n!
[
vd(S ∪ {i})− vd(S)
]
.
A symmetrical expression can be obtained for μj(N, v, d). Then
μi(N, v, d)− μj(N, v, d) =
=
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
(s + 1)!(n− 2− s)!
n!
[
vd(S ∪ {i, j})− vd(S ∪ {j})
]
+
+
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− 1− s)!
n!
[
vd(S ∪ {i})− vd(S)
]
−
− ∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
(s + 1)!(n− 2− s)!
n!
[
vd(S ∪ {i, j})− vd(S ∪ {i})
]
−
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− ∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− 1− s)!
n!
[
vd(S ∪ {j})− vd(S)
]
.
All terms different from vd(S ∪ {i}) or vd(S ∪ {j}) vanish and thus
μi(N, v, d)− μj(N, v, d) =
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
[
s!(n− 1− s)!
n!
+
(s + 1)!(n− 2− s)!
n!
] [
vd(S ∪ {i})− vd(S ∪ {j})
]
=
=
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− 2− s)!
(n− 1)!
[
vd(S ∪ {i})− vd(S ∪ {j})
]
. (4)
Since vd(S) = vd\{(i,j)}(S) for all S ⊂ N \ {i} or S ⊂ N \ {j}, it is obvious
that expression (4) coincides with μi(N, v, d \ {(i, j)}) − μj(N, v, d \ {(i, j)})
and thus fairness is proved.
All that is left to prove now is that any allocation rule on DCSN that satisfies
component efficiency and fairness has to coincide with the digraph Myerson
value. We will prove this by induction on the number of arcs in the digraph
(N, d). 3 Let Ψ be an allocation rule on DCSN that is component efficient and
fair.
Firstly, consider the digraph communication situation (N, v, ∅) ∈ DCSN with
no arcs. Then, all nodes are isolated nodes and component efficiency of both
Ψ and μ implies that for all i ∈ N , Ψi(N, v, ∅) = vd(i) = v(i) = μi(N, v, ∅).
Now, let (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN be a communication situation with |d| = k ≥ 1 arcs,
and by the induction hypothesis suppose that Ψ and μ coincide for directed
communication situations with less than k arcs. Using this hypothesis and
fairness of both Ψ and μ we have that for any arc (i, j) ∈ d:
Ψi(N, v, d)−Ψj(N, v, d) = Ψi(N, v, d \ {(i, j)})−Ψj(N, v, d \ {(i, j)}) =
3 Recall that Myerson (1977) proved uniqueness of his value for undirected com-
munication situations by induction on the number of edges.
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= μi(N, v, d \ {(i, j)})− μj(N, v, d \ {(i, j)}) = μi(N, v, d)− μj(N, v, d) (5)
It is easily obtained that (5) holds for all i and j that are in the same connected
component. This is true because, even if two nodes in a connected component
are not connected, they always have a common node in that component to
which they are connected. And thus, for C ∈ N/d(γ) there exists a number
dC such that Ψi(N, v, d) − μi(N, v, d) = dC for all i ∈ C. Using component
efficiency of both Ψ and μ we have that for a component C ∈ N/d
0 =
∑
i∈C
Ψi(N, v, d)−
∑
i∈C
μi(N, v, d) =
∑
i∈C
dC = |C|dC and thus dC = 0. Hence:
Ψ(N, v, d) = μ(N, v, d). 
The next result proves that, in the previous theorem fairness can be replaced
by the requirement of balanced contributions. The balanced contributions
property for digraph communication situations states that the harm that the
isolation of player i can inflict upon player j is the same as the harm that
isolation of player j can inflict upon player i.
In order to formalize this definition, given a digraph (N, d), let us denote
(N, d−k) for the digraph given by d−k = {(i, j) ∈ d | k ∈ {i, j}}.
Definition 4.3 An allocation rule Ψ : DCSN → IRn satisfies the balanced
contributions property if, for all (N, v, d) ∈ DCSN and all i, j ∈ N :
Ψj(N, v, d)−Ψj(N, v, d−i) = Ψi(N, v, d)−Ψi(N, v, d−j).
Theorem 4.2 The digraph Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on
DCSN that satisfies component efficiency and balanced contributions.
Proof 4.2 It is already shown in the proof of Theorem 4.1 that the digraph
Myerson value satisfies component efficiency.
21
To prove that it satisfies balanced contributions, let us observe that if (N, v, d)
is in DCSN and i, j ∈ N , then, for S ⊂ N \ {i, j}, the following holds:
vd(S∪{i}) = vd−j(S∪{i}), vd(S∪{j}) = vd−i(S∪{j}) and vd−j(S) = vd−i(S).
And thus from (4), we obtain
μi(N, v, d)− μj(N, v, d) =
=
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− 2− s)!
(n− 1)!
[
vd−j(S ∪ {i})− vd−i(S ∪ {j})
]
=
=
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− 2− s)!
(n− 1)!
[
vd−j(S ∪ {i})− vd−j(S) + vd−i(S)− vd−i(S ∪ {j})
]
=
=
∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− 2− s)!
(n− 1)!
[
vd−j(S ∪ {i})− vd−j(S)
]
−
− ∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− 2− s)!
(n− 1)!
[
vd−i(S ∪ {j})− vd−i(S)
]
=
= μi(N, v, d−j)− μj(N, v, d−i).
The last equality can be obtained in the same way we proved (4).
Finally, the proof of uniqueness mimics (using again the induction on the
number of arcs in (N, d)) the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 4.1
(but applying balanced contributions instead of fairness) and is therefore omit-
ted. 
5 Final Remarks
1. The purpose of this paper is to give a generalization of the Myerson value
and provide axiomatizations through the properties of component efficiency,
fairness and balanced contributions. Nevertheless, there are other properties
of the classical Myerson value such as, for instance, stability that deserve,
we consider, to be analyzed in this new setting. Stability for undirected com-
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munication situations means that deleting a link between two players does
not increase the payoff of these two players. We can generalize this notion to
digraph communication situations as follows.
Definition 5.1 An allocation rule Ψ : DCSN −→ IRn is stable if, for all
(N, v, d) ∈ DCSN , and for any arc (i, j) ∈ d it holds that Ψk(N, v, d) ≥
Ψk(N, v, d \ {(i, j)}), k = i, j.
In the case of the classical Myerson value defined on CSN we know (Myerson,
1977) that a sufficient condition for stability is superadditivity of the initial
game. The next example proves that in this new setting superadditivity is not
sufficient to guarantee stability.
Example 5.1 Let us consider the digraph communication situation (N, vˆ, d)
where N = {1, 2, . . . , 12},
v =
∑
S⊂N, s≥2
(−1)s 2s−2uS, vˆ =
∑
S⊂N, s≥2, T∈π(S)
(−1)s 2s−2wT
and (N, d) is given by d = {(1, 2), (1, 8), (1, 9), (1, 10), (1, 11), (1, 12), (2, 1), (2, 3),
(2, 4), (2, 5), (2, 6), (2, 7)}, as represented in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Digraph in Examples 5.1 and 5.2
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It can be argued that (N, vˆ) is superadditive. Although it is not clear how
to define the concept of superadditivity for generalized games, any definition
should extend the one for standard games. The generalized game vˆ in this
example is the transformed game of v, a classical superadditive game and thus,
must be considered as superadditive in the generalized setting.
We have that, for i = j, i, j ∈ N :
wd(i,j) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2!u{i,j}, if (i, j) ∈ d
1
2!u{1,2,j}, if [i = 1, j ∈ {3, . . . , 7}] or [i = 2, j ∈ {8, . . . , 12}]
0, otherwise
wd(i,j,k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
3!
u{i,j,k}, if [i = 1, j = 2] or [i = 2, j = 1]
0, otherwise
and wdT = 0 if T ∈ π(S) with S ⊂ N , 4 ≤ s ≤ 12. Then, using the previously
mentioned additivity property:
μ1(N, vˆ, d) =
(
7 · 1
2
+ 10 · 1
3
)
1
2!
+ (−2) · 20 · 1
3
· 1
3!
=
43
36
, and
μ2(N, vˆ, d) = μ1(N, vˆ, d), by symmetry.
Let us consider now the directed communication situation (N, vˆ, d \ {(1, 2)}).
As is derived from previous calculations, the digraph Myerson value for players
1 and 2 depend only on the number of ordered coalitions of size 2 and 3 to
which they belong and the dividends of these coalitions. Then:
μ1(N, vˆ, d \ {(1, 2)})) =
(
6 · 1
2
+ 5 · 1
3
)
1
2!
+ (−2) · 5 · 1
3
· 1
3!
=
64
36
.
And so, if arc (1, 2) is removed, the value for player 1 increases, even though vˆ
is a superadditive game. Thus, superadditivity does not imply stability in this
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setting.
2. Another open problem is the inheritance of properties in directed communi-
cation situations. It is not obvious in which manner properties such as supera-
ditivity, convexity or even solution concepts as the core, should be extended
to this framework of generalized games and then, it is difficult to analyze the
inheritance of properties.
Nevertheless, it is easy to find some pathologies. Let us look at the superad-
ditivity. Even if we don’t know a definition of this property for generalized
games, it is obvious that whatever definition is used, this definition must ex-
tend the well-known one for TU-games. Then, using Example 5.1 it is easy
to prove that superadditivity is not, in general, inherited by the digraph re-
stricted game.
Example 5.2 Effectively, suppose (N, vˆ, d) is defined as in Example 5.1.
(N, v) is a superadditive game (as a TU-game) and consider A, B ⊂ N ,
A = {1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}; B = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Then
vˆd(A) =
Δ∗vˆ(1, 8) + Δ
∗
vˆ(1, 9) + Δ
∗
vˆ(1, 10) + Δ
∗
vˆ(1, 11) + Δ
∗
vˆ(1, 12)
2
=
5
2
.
vˆd(B) =
Δ∗vˆ(2, 3) + Δ
∗
vˆ(2, 4) + Δ
∗
vˆ(2, 5) + Δ
∗
vˆ(2, 6) + Δ
∗
vˆ(2, 7)
2
=
5
2
.
vˆd(A ∪B) = vˆd(A) + vˆd(B) +
7∑
j=3
Δ∗vˆ(1, j)
2!
+
12∑
j=8
Δ∗vˆ(2, j)
2!
+
+
Δ∗vˆ(1, 2) + Δ
∗
vˆ(2, 1)
2!
+
12∑
k=3
Δ∗vˆ(1, 2, k) + Δ
∗
vˆ(2, 1, k)
3!
=
= vˆd(A) + vˆd(B) + 5 · 1
2!
+ 5 · 1
2!
+ 2 · 1
2!
+ (−2) · 20 · 1
3!
=
= vˆd(A) + vˆd(B)− 2
3
< vˆd(A) + vˆd(B).
3. There exist other characterizations of the Myerson value that use additional
properties such as the superfluous player and player anonymity properties. It
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could be interesting to analyze the meaning and usefulness of these properties
in this new context and to explore if, eventually, that characterizations still
holds.
4. Previous results could be extended to a probabilistic setting as it was done,
for the case of (undirected) communication situations in Go´mez et al. (2007)
5. If we assume that our model introduces an asymmetry between both in-
cident players in a fixed arc, fairness can be viewed as a not very appealing
property. Nevertheless, for such models in which the arcs represent commu-
nications between players (and then both players are equally important to
establish this communication), this fairness property seems desirable.
6. Other future questions could be the exploration of calculation methods for
the digraph Myerson value, as in Go´mez et al. (2004a and 2004b), and in
particular of the restricted game dividends.
7. Moreover, it seems very appealing to study and generalize alternative values
for communication situations such as the value proposed by Hamiache (1999)
or the Position Value (see Borm, Owen and Tijs, 1992).
8. The introduced value also can be used to obtain a centrality measure for
actors or nodes in directed social networks, generalizing the one defined in
Go´mez et al. (2003), for undirected social networks.
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